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Precarious Working Conditions of Student-Athletes 
Jamie Brackpool & Laura Neil 
Abstract: 
 This paper explores the precarious working conditions of student-athlet-
ics through an analysis of the exploitative structure of the National Collegiate 
Athletics Association (NCAA). We will discuss the case of Northwestern Uni-
versity football players’ attempt to unionize we will then demonstrate that the 
classification of “student-athletes” has prevented college athletes from obtaining 
standard employment relationship rights. The following report aims to position 
student-athletes as employees and suggest alternative strategies for future action 
and avenues for future research. 
Introduction:
 For decades, student-athletes have competed under the precarious condi-
tions governed by the NCAA. With the ability to exploit student-athletes embed-
ded so deeply in its business model, stopping the unethical practices of the NCAA 
is extremely difficult. While the lack of uniformity in the governance of college 
athletics means wholesale policy change is currently unachievable, incremental 
steps are being taken to improve the precarious conditions of student athletes. 
This paper aims to demystify student-athlete working conditions, outline the con-
trolling structure of governance, and suggest new methods to support student-ath-
letes. 
Literature Review:
An abundance of literature exists on collegiate-level sports and athletics. 
However, much of this literature narrowly focuses on sports and its relation to 
media culture. As many scholars have argued, sports as an industry has yet to find 
a place within both the cultural and creative industries outside of the United King-
dom (Rowe 199). Many of these scholars (such as Cunningham, 2013, as well 
as McKinley and Smith, 2009) speak to the ways in which, for many countries, 
sports was not considered to be a part of any notion of creative labour or a creative 
sector. For instance, there was no mention of sport in any articles published by the 
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2Creative Industries Journal between 2008 and 2013. Although a single, definitive 
reason for the exclusion of sports as a creative industry has not yet been deter-
mined, David Rowe, Professor at the Institute for Culture and Society, has provid-
ed some insight into why this might be the case, suggesting that “it has been his-
torically common for some, especially artists and their advocates, to criticize the 
influence of sport on culture and creativity, complaining that it is anti-intellectual, 
unaesthetic, aggressive and instrumental” (Sports, Media and Audiences 413). 
Consequently, topics such as athletic labour policy, athletic activism, and student 
unionization have been largely excluded from major research and discussion.
 While the rigorous intellectual study of sports vis-à-vis commercial ethics 
is a recent phenomenon, the distinction between student-athlete and paid labourer 
dates back to the mid-twentieth century. The term “student-athlete” was coined in 
the 1950’s by former NCAA president Walter Byers. Researchers agree that the 
term is used to avoid liability in cases of worker compensation (Branch; Wade; 
Williams and Masterson); the NCAA, however, insists that the term was designed 
to protect the ‘nobility’ of amateurism in college sports (Wade). “Student-athlete” 
and “amateurism” are, thus, key terms when discussing the precarious position 
of college athletes. Williams and Masterson explain how the term “student-ath-
lete” prevents college players from being classified as employees. Although Wal-
ter Byers did not deny this claim, the NCAA’s preference was that these athletes 
should be seen as students. However, the NCAA’s supposed academic priorities 
have been easily disputed by Mans and Gibbs (2011), Zimbalist (1999), and Far-
rey (2014), who examine multiple cases where students were given an ultimatum 
and forced to choose between academia and sports. Athletes are frequently expect-
ed to take classes that fit with their practice schedules as well as to select majors 
that require less effort and time commitment. 
 Academic and journalistic work that studies the terms “student-athlete” 
and “amateurism” explains that the NCAA uses these terms as justification for its 
own existence. In its manual, the NCAA outlines the principals of amateurism, 
defining them as a tool used to prevent student-athletes from being ‘exploited’ by 
‘professional and commercial enterprises’ (2015-2016 NCAA Division I Manual, 
2.5). To cement the terms student-athlete status into the NCAA’s culture, Byers 
had the terms embedded into as many of the NCAA legal documents as possible 
(Branch; Wade). 
Scholars such as William Casement agree that amateurism is an important 
concept within the NCAA, though it may require reform. In general, Casement 
argues that amateurism helps to maintain the academic integrity of colleges (Case-
ment). He also argues, however, that, Casement also agrees that the way teams are 
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governed needs serious reconsideration. Casement suggests that teams be owned 
by alumni organizations and run off of donations from affiliate professional teams 
looking for tax breaks. In this way, he proposes a complete separation between 
athleticism and the athletic environment, arguing that the athletes should be paid a 
salary instead of a scholarship. The eligibility rules would still apply and players 
would still need to be students who adhere to a certain academic standard. Case-
ment’s primary goal would be to restrict the NCAA to limited governance roles, 
taking away their profit-making role.
 The leading voice within the discussion of student-athletes as employees, 
however, is Peter Sung Ohr, the regional director of the Chicago office for the 
National Labour Relations Board (NLRB). In one famous case, Ohr, on behalf of 
the NLRB, ruled in favour of a group of Northwestern Football players who were 
attempting to unionize by declaring them employees. In his verdict, Ohr provid-
ed two main reasons why these athletes should be considered workers. Ohr saw 
firstly that the time student-athletes commit to their teams is incredibly high, and 
secondly, that coaches have tremendous control over player scholarships, control 
which Ohe saw as a valid contract for compensation (Williams and Masterson). 
This ruling was a huge step for student-athletes, although it ultimately had little 
long-term impact (Ferry; Staples).
 Scholars such as Lori Mans and Evan Gibbs also draw connections be-
tween student-athletes and employees. Much like Ohr, Mans and Gibbs’ argu-
ments focus on the time commitment of athletes and the control that coaches have 
over players. Mans and Gibbs also argue that the revenue that athletes generate 
should classify them as employees. According to Mans and Gibbs, athletes are the 
driving profit-producers behind the NCAA, which begs the question as to why 
these students are not being financially compensated.
 The arguments against the classification of student-athletes as ‘employees’ 
come mostly from the NCAA itself. For example, Donald Remy, a legal spokes-
man for the NCAA, equestioned Ohr’s classification of student-athletes as em-
ployees. The reasoning behind this refusal to call student-athletes ‘employees’ is 
that the former group receives no payment or salary. However, this is an example 
of circular reasoning. This places the student-athletes in a unique position; the 
NCAA refuses to call them ‘employees’ because they do not get paid, yet it re-
fuses to pay them because the sad truth is, there are amateurs and not employees 
(Boudway). Consequently, student-athletes often find themselves in a precarious 
economic situation.
Precarity is a key term guiding this research. Therefore, it is important 
to understand and define the meaning of precarious work, as well as the position 
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to understand the ways in which precarity manifests within the realm of collegiate 
athletics. Precarity, broadly defined, refers to intermittent, insecure forms of em-
ployment marked by conditions of low pay and long hours. Additionally, precarity 
is most commonly associated with people holding jobs within the creative econo-
my. The key to understanding precarious labour is to define its opposing employ-
ment structure. This employment structure has been referred to by Wayne Lew-
chuch, Professor at McMaster University in the School of Labour studies, as ‘the 
standard employment relationship.’ Lewchuck defines the standard employment 
relationship as a policy that “provided workers with job security and training that 
enables them to advance within a given organization. They [benefit] from govern-
ment policies that [protect] their right to bargain collectively and to form unions” 
(17). The lack of such policies leaves workers in precarious working conditions. 
Methodology:
The purpose of our research is to demystify the student-athlete experi-
ence, situate the athlete as a working professional, and uncover the answers to 
the following questions: What are the key dimensions of precarity endured by 
student-athletes? What efforts, if any, have been made to protect the rights of stu-
dent-athletes as workers? And what still needs to be done to improve the working 
conditions of student-athletes?
As previously stated, a key term guiding our analysis is that of precarity. 
We will examine the various forms of precarity endured by student-athletes work-
ing within the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA).  Additionally, 
we will position the student-athlete as a working professional by employing a 
historical and contextual approach, treating the issue like a case study. In order to 
establish parallels between the position of the student-athlete and working profes-
sional, we will explore the recent case of the Northwestern University’s football 
team’s attempt to form a union.
Key Organizations:
 This section of the paper aims to provide a brief overview of key organi-
zations surrounding the discussion of employment relations of student-athletics 
in the NCAA. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is an independent 
federal agency in the United States which protects the rights of private-sector em-
ployees to join together, with or without a union, in order to improve their wages 
and working conditions. The board began operating during the Great Depression 
in 1935 and continued to operate through World War II and the ensuing economic 
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instability. The board’s goal is to guarantee the rights of employees to bargain 
collectively. The agency has the power both to safeguard employees’ rights to 
organize and to determine whether to form a union to serve as the employees’ 
bargaining representative. In doing so, the NLRB often conducts elections, inves-
tigates allegations of unjust labour practices, facilitates settlements, decides cases, 
and enforces orders. Importantly, the board has previously worked on several cas-
es in the realm of organized athletics at both professional and amateur levels. For 
example, in 1994, the NLRB was responsible for the $30 million dollar back pay 
for professional football players involved in the players’ strike of 1987. 
Because this research paper focuses primarily on the Northwestern Foot-
ball unionization case, references to the NLRB refer mainly to the board’s Chica-
go division. In relation to the case, the NLRB played a major role in the ruling on 
whether student-athletes should or should not be considered employees of accred-
ited NCAA institutions. Chicago’s NLRB Director, Peter Sung Ohr, is a prominent 
figure in our research because his work outlines various reasons for considering 
student-athletes as employees.
On January 28, 2014, former college football player  Ramogi Huma an-
nounced the formation of another key organization, the College Athletes Play-
ers Association (CAPA). Shortly after this announcement, the CAPA stated that 
it wished to be recognized by the NLRB as the Northwestern scholarship foot-
ball players.The CAPA’s current goal is to win the case on behalf Northwestern 
scholarship athletes; however, the CAPA recognizes the need to fight for other 
efforts as well. The CAPA, ultimately, hopes to represent all student-athletes in 
the NCAA, bargaining for causes including the improvement of student-athlete 
graduation rates, the reduction of sports-related brain trauma, and the allowance 
of student-athletes to receive commercial sponsorships (collegeathletesplayersas-
sociation.com). 
Student-Athletes in the NCAA:
Collegiate athletics started when students self-organized in order to play 
sports at their institutions. After collegiate sports began to grow in popularity, 
competition between different institutions became more common and eventually 
the first intercollegiate event occurred, a rowing competition between Yale and 
Harvard in 1852. Alongside the growth in popularity of these competitions, many 
new sports were introduced and some of the events started to receive sponsor-
ships. For example, “Boston, Concord & Montreal Railroad Company was the of-
ficial transportation sponsor of the [Yale vs. Harvard rowing] competition” (Bass, 
Schaeperkoetter, and Bunds 3). These competitions were organized by students 
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value of college sports. In 1895, university officials gathered to discuss potential 
ways in which they could administer college athletics. Several universities came 
together and formed the Big Ten, the first organized group dedicated to regulating 
the game of college sports (Bass, Schaeperkoetter, and Bunds 4). 
 The next major development in collegiate athletics came in 1905 when 
President Theodore Roosevelt called a meeting with members of Harvard, Yale, 
and Princeton Universities to discuss the game of American Football. Since the 
sport had only been invented a few decades prior and had only been played be-
tween Rutgers and Princeton, the actual rules of the sport were not yet codified. 
The unfortunate result was the death of 18 players and 140 serious injuries in the 
relatively brief history of the sport. After the meeting with President Roosevelt, 62 
schools joined in 1906 to form a new governing body, the Intercollegiate Athletics 
Association of the United States (IAAUS). In 1910, the organization renamed 
itself the National Collegiate Athletics Association (NCAA) (Bass, Schaeperkoet-
ter, and Bunds 4). 
 Since then, the NCAA has undergone major changes. To start, the organiza-
tion elected their first president, Walter Byers, in 1951 (Bass, Schaeperkoetter, and 
Bunds 6). From this time onward, the NCAA’s grip on college athletics became 
ever stronger. In 1973, the NCAA divided member schools into three divisions. 
The division of teams was based on the amount of revenue each school collected; 
the most profitable schools were placed in Division I, the less profitable schools 
were placed in Division II, and the least profitable schools were placed in Divi-
sion III. The classification of these schools in divisions impacted the treatment of 
students. Division I schools allowed student-athletes to receive ‘full-scholarships’ 
for athletics, Division II only allotted partial scholarships for athletics, and Divi-
sion III did not give students any scholarships for athletics contributions. Division 
I was later divided further into Division I-A, I-AA, and I-AAA, with revenue 
becoming the main filtering tool (Bass, Schaeperkoetter, and Bunds 9). Since its 
inception, the NCAA has grown into one of the largest sporting franchises in the 
world, raking in massive amounts of money from television and sponsorship deals, 
despite claiming to be a not-for-profit organization. Aside from administrative and 
coaching roles, all of the NCAA’s labour is free labour and the association justifies 
its treatment of students by using two terms:  “student-athlete” and “amateurism.” 
 A key aspect of the NCAA financial model is the exchange of athletic 
contributions for scholarships. Athletic scholarships, also known as Athletic Aid 
Agreements (AAA’s), vary depending on both the institution providing the schol-
arship as well as the player receiving the financial aid. There are some standard 
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AAA agreements that require the student be a member of the school and remain 
accountable to the NCAA division-wide rules.  It should also be noted that once 
a student receives an athletic scholarship, they are usually not allowed to receive 
any additional funding opportunities (Frank). 
The Northwestern University Case:
 This paper follows the case of the Northwestern University football team. 
The players’ attempt to unionize is groundbreaking and demonstrates the precar-
ious living conditions of the student-athlete as well as the current efforts being 
made to improve these conditions. The case started on January 28, 2014, when the 
CAPA filed a petition to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) on behalf of 
the Northwestern football players with scholarships. The petition asked permis-
sion for the CAPA to be recognized as the union representative for the scholarship 
student-athletes of Northwestern football. The university opposed the petition, de-
claring that NLRB jurisdiction only applies to employees, a classification to which 
scholarship athletes did not conform (Mans and Gibbs 34). 
 On March 26th 2014, Northwestern University lost its leverage when Peter 
Sung Ohr, declared student-athletes to be employees based on the time commit-
ment student-athletes gave to the sport, as well as the contractual relationship 
between player and coach being similar to that of an employee and an employer. 
While, technically, Ohr’s ruling only applied to scholarship football athletes at 
Northwestern, his decision could potentially be extended to other privately owned 
Division I NCAA schools (Staples). Also it is important to note that the ruling 
was made not due to the working conditions or treatment of student-athletes, but 
instead was due to the relationship between the athletes and the university resem-
bling an employee-employer relationship (Strauss and Eder).
 This ‘victory’ for unionization was short-lived. On August 16, 2015, the 
NLRB refused to acknowledge the ruling that NCAA athletes be considered em-
ployees. The NLRB board based its decision on the fact that any ruling the board 
enforced would set a precedent only for private schools like Northwestern, since 
NLRB jurisdiction does not extend to public universities, thereby disrupting sta-
bility within the league. While the NLRB suggested that it might reconsider its 
stance in the future, they refused to take any current action (Farrey). 
Although this distinction between student-athlete and employee may seem 
trivial, excluding college athletes from identifying as employees prevents such 
athletes from receiving many of the benefits their labour entitles them to, such 
as workers compensation or the right to unionize. In this section of the paper, we 
will argue that student-athletes should be identified as employees. As previously 
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8mentioned, the most prominent name in this discussion is Peter Sung Ohr. Ohr, the 
regional director of the Chicago NLRB, has been outspoken on this matter, claim-
ing that, in the case of the Northwestern Football Team, college athletes ought to 
be considered employees (Staples). Ohr’s position is based on several reasons, 
mainly the sizable athlete time commitment as well as the resemblance between 
the athlete–coach dynamic and an employee-employer relationship (Williamsand 
Masterson 52-53).
 The argument that college athletes, put as much time into athletics as many 
people put into their careers, is justified. The time commitment student-athletes 
dedicate to sports includes not only in-season training, but also a year-round cycle 
(Mans and Gibbs 35). Mans and Gibbs lay out the year-round training schedule for 
the Northwestern University Football Team as follows. From the beginning of Au-
gust until the beginning of the season, athletes spend approximately 50-60 hours 
per week taking part in team-oriented training, and “their days during training 
camp are spent in various types of rehabilitation and athletic training activities, 
practice on the field, meetings, and participation in team meals” (Mans and Gibbs 
35). At the end of the training camp, the regular 12-game season begins and lasts 
from September to November. During this time, athletes spend roughly 40-50 
hours per week participating in football activities and their weekday schedules 
often start at 6:30am, while on Saturdays they begin games at 7:30am. For away 
games, the team usually travels to the opposition school’s city the night before the 
actual game, making some game days a whole-day commitment. Once the sea-
son finishes, players partake in fitness and cardio training starting in mid-January, 
which consists of around 12-15 hours a week. In mid-February, the time commit-
ment goes up to 20-25 hours per week as the team gets  back on the field for its 
spring football camp. In mid-April, the camp ends and each player is expected to 
continue with his own spring workout training until the end of the academic year. 
At the beginning of June, the athletes finally get to rest, as they are allowed to 
return home for the summer. Unfortunately, this break is short-lived, lasting only 
two weeks. At the end of that time, the athletes return to school where they take 
part in 20-25 hours of workouts until training camp begins in August (Mans and 
Gibbs, 35). This level of time commitment is arguably more than that of a full-
time worker (Strauss and Eder). 
 Ohr’s second argument is that the contractual relationship between a stu-
dent-athlete and a coach/university is similar to the relationship between an em-
ployee and an employer (Williams and Masterson 53). The relationship between 
an employee and an employer is a contractual agreement stating that the employee 
will provide labour in exchange for compensation. The purpose of this labour is 
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to benefit the employer, who receives profit and monetary return. College athletes 
serve the same purpose for their affiliate universities. The service they supply to 
their ‘employer’ is playing high-level sports; when these athletes compete, they at-
tract spectators to purchase merchandise and tickets, driving revenue up and con-
tributing to external interest resulting in lucrative television deals. For example, 
the NCAA received between $30 and $40 million dollars at the beginning of the 
1980’s from CBS and EPSN (Bass, Schaeperkoetter, and Bunds 21-22). Although 
athletes are ‘compensated’ through scholarships, these small packages are usual-
ly only enough to pay for tuition, living accommodations, and meals (Mans and 
Gibbs 34). Due to the previously mentioned comparisons between student-athletes 
and employees, Ohr ruled in favour of the Northwestern Football Players, stating 
that they should be considered university employees. This ruling allowed the play-
ers to take their first steps towards unionization, which was a massive blow for the 
NCAA and the Northwestern University Athletics Department (Staples). 
In most standard employment relationships, both employee and employer 
gain equal benefits. Employees receive fair compensation for their labour, while 
employers and/or companies generate profit and improve their professional rep-
utation. The terms and conditions of ‘work’ between student-athletes and the 
NCAA function much like those of standard employment. However, a remarkable 
difference exists in beneficial compensation. In the world of college sports, the 
student-athlete is effectively a labourer and the NCAA an employer, but both par-
ties do not benefit equally. The NCAA operates as a business fuelled solely by the 
efforts of student-athletes who receive zero profit for their labour. So, who benefits 
from this relationship? 
 First and foremost of the beneficiaries are the NCAA and its accredited 
institutions. The NCAA has grown into a billion dollar industry by commercial-
izing student-athletes through a ‘reliance on outside entities such as corporate 
sponsors, ticket sale revenues, and television broadcast payouts.’ In essence, ‘ath-
letic departments function more like a business than almost any other university 
unit” (Bass, Schaeperkoetter, and Bunds 23). In fact a large portion of the NCAA’s 
revenue comes from the licensing and branding of athletic merchandise, as “the 
sport licensing industry ranks as one of the top revenue producers in the licensing 
world” (Mooreman and Hambrick 161). To manage this extensive revenue stream, 
the NCAA employs an external body, known as the Collegiate Licensing Compa-
ny (CLC). Sports merchandise has become so popular that sports companies and 
leagues hold five of the top twenty spots among the world’s leading licensors, with 
the CLC clinching the fourth spot with a net worth of 2.5 billion dollars (Moore-
man and Hambrick). The problem, according to unionization activists, is that “the 
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NCAA, the CLC, and others receive compensation for the sales of student-athlete 
merchandise without compensating the athletes for the value they afford the relat-
ed licenses and products” (161). Under NCAA regulation, student-athletes’ names 
are not to be used or sold on athletic merchandise; only an athlete’s number may 
be used by these organizations. Although the merchandise is not branded by name, 
however, the athlete’s number transposes a specific student-athlete’s merit onto 
the object, and in turn, the althlete’s labour results in non-athletic commodification 
for which he is not properly compensated. 
 With such large sums of money to be made in branding, the NCAA has 
recently made three significant investments to further grow its licensing potential. 
Peter Davis, director of corporate alliances for the NCAA, outlines these three 
areas of investment: first, online investments, intended to push the sales of a larger 
volume of merchandise; second, promotion and marketing investments calculated 
to generate interest in premium branded merchandise created in partnership with 
many of the NCAA’s corporate sponsors. As a result of these investments, Moore-
man and Hambrick report that, as a result of investments like these by companies 
and sports leagues around the world, ‘revenues from global licensed sport apparel 
and other goods grew by $3.1 billion in 2008 to $19.9 billion in one year” (To 
License or Not to License). Not only do the NCAA’s profits increase through mer-
chandise and ticket sales, but also this commoditization turns the NCAA and its 
accredited institutions into viable brands to be fetishized by consumers. Branding, 
thus, builds the NCAA’s reputation while feeding a continuous cycle of profit-gen-
erating consumerism.  
 Television broadcasters are another major beneficiary of student-athletics, 
especially as “the development of national and international sporting competi-
tions, the ‘maturation’ of media advertising, and the emergence of broadcast me-
dia for which there was no or limited direct payment by the ‘consumer’, [created] 
new revenue streams and users of sports media” (Sports, Culture and the Media 
66). Collegiate athletics has become an ever-present sector of the television media 
landscape, and TV stations fight for the rights to own a share of NCAA sports 
broadcasting. In fact, today’s industry practically requires that any viable network 
have sports in order to help raise the profile of its other properties. Of course, the 
NCAA still generates the majority of profits while the athletes receive none. 
 The Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) was the original broadcaster of 
NCAA sports, and “after the epic 1979 NCAA men’s basketball championship… 
the NCAA increased its television rights deal with CBS” (Bass, Schaeperkoetter, 
and Bunds 21). Shortly after the championship, the NCAA struck a deal with a 
newly formed broadcasting company, ESPN, which then aired all of the men’s 
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tournament games not covered by CBS. Television deals were lucrative for the 
NCAA, evidenced by the fact that “for the first part of the 1980’s the NCAA re-
ceived between $30 million and $40 million annually combined between CBS and 
ESPN for television rights for the NCAA tournament” (Bass, Schaeperkoetter, and 
Bunds 22). To further capitalize on market opportunity, the NCAA started to alter 
major tournament schedules. These schedules were extended in order to generate 
a larger profit for broadcasters. For example, March Madness, the popular annual 
college basketball tournament, was extended to a three-week-long event. This de-
cision not only increased broadcasting revenue but also generated large amounts 
of sponsorship money. 
 In 2010, the NCAA added a fourteen year combined partnership with CBS 
and Turner Sports for $10.8 billion in profits. The abundance of media coverage 
transformed college basketball, as well as college football, into a nationally-pop-
ular commercial product, and college football experienced a similar growth. In 
fact, college football television deals represent the largest revenue source out of all 
collegiate-level athletics. With low production costs, the CBS, ESPN, and Turner 
Sports networks further benefitted from the creation of low-cost, sport-specific 
channels and subscription packages. As an example of how extensive TV broad-
casting contracts are, “ESPN and its associated platforms (ABC, ESPN1, ESPN2, 
ESPNU, etc.), aired more than 450 college football games during the 2012 season”, 
available to viewers through a basic satellite-cable fee (Bass, Schaeperkoetter, 
and Bunds 23). At the same time, ESPN and other networks offer ‘pay-per-view’ 
or On-Demand exclusive access to major championship matches such as March 
Madness,  with providers like ESPN claiming that, for a small purchasing fee, 
these premium services heighten viewing experience for the sports connoisseur. 
Therefore, “not only have these [lucrative television] contracts had the effects of 
raising subscription levels, but … they have [also,] in some cases, included a pay-
per-view element, with its opportunities for the kind of direct economic exchange 
between sports provider and sports spectator” (Sports, Culture and Media 77). 
Rowe further explains the profitable nature of mediated sport, noting how a single 
live sports television broadcast can not only be shown in real time to both a live 
and televised audience, but also that it can also be replayed, cut up, and packaged 
in a myriad of economical ways (71). The repackaging of live sports reached its 
acme when networks began capitalizing on the sale of online streaming access 
through websites such as NCAA.com and CBSSports.com. 
 There are also numerous external corporations and manufacturers who 
benefit from student-athletic labour. Currently, the company drawing the most me-
dia attention is Electronic Arts Inc (EA), a software company based in Redwood 
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City, California that develops sports-related video games. EA is well known for 
its realistic representations of both professional and collegiate-level sports teams 
in games such as Madden NFL Football and NCAA Football. These games are re-
made and re-released annually. The first NCAA-related sports game created by EA 
was Bill Walsh College Football. Released in 1993, Bill Walsh College Football 
was the first of twenty-one collegiate football games made by EA between 1993 
and 2013. 
 EA’s sports-related games allow fans to actively to actively participate in 
major competitions between sports teams. In particular, they are known for their 
realistic depictions of sporting events (Mooreman and Hambrick 160). Recently, 
the games’ realistic representations have embroiled EA Sports in numerous legal 
battles with college athletes. These athletes claim that “EA Sports profited off the 
likeness of players while offering no compensation for the college athletes fea-
tured in the games” (Catangay-Liew). On July 31, 2013, Samuel Michael Keller 
(a former American football quarterback) and Edward O’Bannon (a former UCLA 
Bruin) filed a class-action lawsuit against EA Sports and the NCAA for profiting 
off of their likenesses while providing them with no benefits. The gist of Keller’s 
argument is that “the defendants used student-athletes names, voices, signatures, 
photographs, images, likeness, distinctive appearances, gestures and manner-
isms for commercial gain without proper consent from the athletes” (Mooreman 
and Hambrick 161). Keller and O’Bannon, along with 20,000 other student-ath-
letes, have filed claims due to these allegedly unjust software sales by EA and 
the NCAA. The NCAA operates under a manual of bylaws, with section number 
12.5 specifically dedicated to the protection of student-athletes in promotional 
activities. Keller essential argument is that “EA violated NCAA … bylaw 12.5, 
which specifically prohibits the commercial licensing of an NCAA athlete’s name, 
picture, or likeness and the NCAA has allowed the company to do so without pen-
alty” (Mooreman and Hambrick 160-161). Although EA Sports wanted to pay the 
players represented in the video games, the NCAA’s strict guidelines prohibited 
EA from doing so. The game producers attempted to lobby NCAA policy makers 
to change the guidelines to allow EA to compensate the athletes with a portion of 
the “$80 million in annual revenue generated by the NCAA series games” (Catan-
gay-Liew). However, the NCAA would not reconsider its stance on the issue. Part 
of the NCAA’s reluctance to change its decision can be linked to the institutional 
profit derived from the games. If the athletes are unable to accept compensation 
for their athletic image and status, more money is available to be paid directly to 
the NCAA. Consequently, Roger Noll, Stanford Sports Economist, describes the 
NCAA as a “powerful profit-driven ‘cartel’ that rules the big-budget business of 
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college sports” (Talep). The NCAA can be considered a ‘cartel’ insofar as it holds 
considerable power over the marketplace of college athletics because its rules 
govern which schools can participate in athletic competitions and forbid players 
from getting paid. 
 Claudia Wilken, the judge presiding over the Keller-O’Bannon case, ruled 
that $60 million dollars should be paid to the NCAA athletes. In the end, the athletes 
who filed motions against EA Sports and the NCAA each received around $7,200 
for their labour. With the NCAA unwilling to budge on commercial compensation, 
EA was forced to cease creation of collegiate athletic video games. The triumph of 
the athletes involved in this case serves as evidence that the multi-million dollar 
student-athletics industry is fuelled by the exploitation of free labour.  
 One of the strongest defenses the NCAA offers against the payment of its 
athletes is that its students receive fair compensation in the form of tuition schol-
arships. However, even though scholarships are given, however, a ‘meaningful’ 
education is usually not provided. Because of the students’ extreme commitment 
to sports, the quality of their education suffers. Technically, the NCAA is correct 
in claiming that its scholarships give student-athletes access to meaningful ed-
ucations; however, the combination of intense training schedules and rigourous 
academic standards required for player eligibility means that certain majors are 
unrealistic for students who wish to succeed equally in athletics and academia. 
There are numerous cases of student-athletes receiving educations that are inferior 
to their non-student-athlete counterparts. 
 Athletes are often required to maintain certain grade point averages in or-
der to remain eligible for college athletics. In order to remain eligible, athletes 
must be “enrolled in at least a minimum full-time program of studies, be in good 
academic standing, and maintain progress toward a baccalaureate or equivalent 
degree” (2015-2016 NCAA Division I Manual, 14.01.02). The manual also re-
quires students to be in ‘good academic standing,’ a term now defined by the col-
leges individually (2015-2016 NCAA Division I Manual, 14.01.01 – 14.02.01). 
Moreover, the NCAA is no longer able to determine the meaning of academic 
standards because these standards were continuously lowered in order to allow 
less academically inclined student-athletes to remain eligible to play. The NCAA 
even claims that half C’s and half D’s are too difficult for athletes to achieve 
(Zimbalist 22). As a result, many academic institutions have attempted to raise the 
standard of academic success by requiring that students maintain a higher GPA 
than was previously expected by the NCAA. 
What the NCAA fails to comment on is the type of education students 
are getting. Some athletes, realizing that their eligibility depends on their ability 
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to achieve good grades, opt to take ‘easy’ majors that require little effort. During 
the late 1980’s, when there was concern over the notion of freshman eligibility in 
NCAA athletics, universities saw this trend of athletes taking ‘meaningless’ ma-
jors become a harsh reality. For example, “University of Iowa president Hunter 
Rawlings, humiliated after several Iowa football players admitted that they ma-
jored in Water Coloring and Archery, declared that if the NCAA did not abolish 
freshman eligibility he would do so unilaterally” (Zimbalist 22). However, this 
does not mean, however, that all student-athletes are indifferent to academics. 
Some student-athletes wish they could take certain courses, but they understand 
that, realistically, many demanding and rewarding majors require more time than 
they have available. Kain Colter, co-founder of the CAPA and an ex-Northwestern 
Football player, claims that he had to take into account the 40-hour training sched-
ule for football when declaring his major. He admits that his athletic commitments 
required that he make academic sacrifices, such as giving up on his preferred pre-
med major (Farrey).
Sometimes, the NCAA even blocks its student-athletes from taking on op-
portunities that could improve their careers outside of athletics. The case of an-
other ex-Northwestern player, Darnell Autry, serves as a striking example of this 
behaviour. Autry was the star running back on Northwestern’s team. He defied 
expectations by taking the team to the Rose Bowl, the pinnacle of college football, 
for the first time in nearly 50 years. The summer after this dream season, Autry, 
who was majoring in acting and looking to make a career as a professional actor, 
was offered a role in a movie in Rome. Obligated to seek permission, Autry asked 
the NCAA if he could accept the role. The NCAA responded by saying that Au-
try would not have received the role if not for his athletic accomplishments and, 
since the NCAA forbids athletes to receive any compensation for their athletics, 
he would have to forfeit his remaining two years of athletic eligibility in order to 
take the role. After a drawn-out legal battle, the NCAA agreed that, in the future, 
student-athletes in Autry’s position would be able to accept such roles so long as 
they received no compensation for their work (Zimbalist 17).
The NCAA justified its decision to stop Autry from realizing his acting 
dream by claiming that, in their eyes he was already being compensated for his 
work. On numerous occasions, the NCAA has argued that accepting compensa-
tion for athletic work would tarnish athletic amateurism, which is a key principle 
of the NCAA. In the NCAA’s opinion, the classification as an amateur protects 
student-athletes from the influences of professional sports and corporate entities. 
Regardless of the NCAA’s justification, compelling evidence suggests that the 
quality of student-athletes’ education is poor, and we therefore claim that schol-
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arships are not fair compensation for the billions of dollars these student-athletes 
generate for the NCAA. 
Collegiate-level athletic labour is also an example of a new form of work 
called hope labour. Hope labour is a type of motivation or voluntary participation 
that can be “defined as un- or under-compensated work carried out in present, 
often for experience or exposure, in hopes that future employment opportunities 
may follow” (Kuehn and Corrigan 9). By taking on positions categorized as hope 
labour, the individual generally exerts more than they gain in return. These po-
sitions are common in the creative industries and are marked by high levels of 
precarity. The precarious nature of these jobs is often overlooked because many 
of these labourers focus on the utopian values that accompany their work such as 
flexibility and autonomy. As a result, they tend to ignore these jobs’ instability. 
Similar to the rise of the precariat class, hope labour has become normalized and 
neutralized through romanticized, neoliberal ideologies. Inspired by this idealized 
vision of hope labour and the creative industries, many young boys and girls grow 
up with dreams of playing college and professional league sports. Unfortunately, 
according to the NCAA, of the roughly eight million children competing in high-
school-level athletics, only 460,000 of these students will compete at the college 
level. Of those who make it into the NCAA, only a small fraction will realize their 
goal of becoming professional athletes. Figure 1 outlines the professional prob-
abilities for those competing in the top-grossing NCAA sports. Looking specifi-
cally at college football, only 1.6% of those competing in the NCAA will obtain 
professional status, leaving many to question why collegiate-level student-athletes 
continue to invest vast amounts of precarious labour with little chance of return. 
The problem for all but the most skilled athletes is that hope labour functions as 
a meritocratic system in which “work is viewed as an investment that pays off for 
individuals based on merit” (Kuehn and Corrigan 9-10). In relation to the labour 
performed by student-athletes, the link between personal talents and future career 
success becomes evident, and the sad truth is that the vast majority of hopeful 
youths will never possess the talent to become professional athletes.
15
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Fig. 1 Possibility of competing beyond high school and college (NCAA). 
 
 One major reason why athletic hope labour continues to thrive is a direct 
result of the utopian ideals surrounding professional athletic jobs. As mentioned 
earlier, sports and media culture are closely intertwined. For this reason, the 
NCAA has many popular cultural outlets at its disposal for disseminating these 
preferred ideologies. At the same time, popular media independent from the 
NCAA also functions as propaganda perpetuating the “coolness” associated with 
life as a professional athlete. 
A second reason hope labour appeals to young people is the ability of mer-
itocracy, a concept innate to hope labour, to silence inequalities and minimize the 
impact felt by those in precarious employment environments. These individuals 
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operate under the impression that his or her personal ‘merit,’ recognized as their 
skills and talents, will ultimately afford them further career opportunities. Many 
of the students who enter the NCAA expect to receive high-level coaching, which 
in turn will improve their athletic abilities or ‘merit’ and put them at an advantage 
for further career advancement. Not only do collegiate athletic programs offer 
quality training, but athletes also view the experience as a way to gain exposure to 
recruiters. These recruiters are solely responsible for assessing an athlete’s ‘merit’ 
and stand between each athlete and their career advancement. Theoretically, if an 
athlete is skilled enough, he or she will merit a career in one of the most idealized 
professions in the world, and in an age that places more and more emphasis on the 
absolute uniqueness and specialness of every child, it is not difficult to understand 
the popularity of athletic hope labour. Kain Colter, Northwestern quarterback, is 
one of the many young athletes who perpetuate the idea that athletes are motivat-
ed mainly by their “love of the game” and this passion makes it easy to disregard 
precarious working conditions and low probability of employment in the athletic 
profession (Keohane). 
Policy:
This section of the paper will: provide a brief reiteration of some of the 
recent policy attempts dedicated to improving the precarious lifestyles of student 
athletes, highlight the gaps that have led to the failure of these attempts, and pro-
vide suggestions for future action. 
In many countries, sport is not yet considered a sector of the creative in-
dustries. For this reason, relatively little literature exists surrounding labour pol-
itics for collegiate-level student-athletes. With sport becoming a growing sector 
of the creative economy, greater attention ought to be paid to the compensation 
of NCAA athletes. Student-athlete compensation has become a highly debated is-
sue, since many scholars have opposing views on whether student-athletes should 
be compensated beyond athletic scholarships. There exist two major schools of 
thought: on the one hand, several scholars, including Cankle, Handy, and Williams 
(1995), believe that the importance of amateurism in college sports precludes stu-
dent athletes from receiving compensation. This view is summed up by James 
M. Crook, who claims that “paying student athletes is a bad idea [because…] it 
would bring the athlete away from the amateur level and into the professional 
realm” (69).  Donald Remy, chief legal officer for the NCAA, further solidifies 
the ‘student first’ mentality by stating, “we strongly disagree with the notion that 
student-athletes are employees” (“Academics”) 
On the other hand, a vast amount of literature encourages the implementa-
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tion of a salary system for student-athletes as a way to combat the precarious la-
bour conditions endured by these individuals (including scholars such as Williams 
and Masterson 2014; Crawford 1995; Mans and Gibbs 2015; Carpenter 1994; 
Doss and Donahoo 2012; and Wolohan 1994). National Labor Board Director, 
Peter Sung Ohr, presents four factors outlining the ways in which student-athletes 
could be considered employees of the university. These factors are: (1) time com-
mitment, (2) coaches’ control over players, (3) risk of injury, and (4) the structure 
of athletic programs as comparable to those of work environments (Williams and 
Masterson 52-56). Unionization is presented in Ohr’s argument as a way to create 
an equilibrium of rights across all collegiate athletic programs. 
 In an attempt to identify existing gaps within labour politics surrounding 
student-athletics, an investigation of current resistance strategies was undertaken 
in this paper. We will focus on the most recent attempts at unionization, which 
have come from two student-initiated lawsuits against the NCAA. The Northwest-
ern University football programs’ attempt at unionization in January of 2014, as 
outlined in the Journal of Labor and Employment Law by Lori Mans and Evan 
Gibbs, was the first attempt at resistance.  Later, Samantha Sackos, a University 
of Houston soccer player, demanded minimum wage pay for student athletes in 
October 2014. While Stackos’ was a significant case, our current analysis will be 
limited to the Northwestern University example. 
The Northwestern case is the most noteworthy attempt to change the poli-
cies creating precarity for student-athletes. The case started when the CAPA sub-
mitted a petition to the NLRB in an attempt to be recognized as the union repre-
sentatives for the Northwestern scholarship football players. The issue was that the 
NCAA and Northwestern university, despite CAPA’s petition to become the union 
representative for the football players, still refused to recognize the players as em-
ployees, and because the NLRB’s decree only only applied to employees, the CA-
PA’s attempt at unionization appeared to be stymied. The next major breakthrough 
came when Peter Sung Ohr sided with the CAPA and ruled that players were, in 
fact, employees. A year later, however, the NLRB refused to partake in any ruling 
that would grant Northwestern athletes the ability to unionize. The NLRB, which 
only had jurisdiction over private schools like Northwestern, believed that allow-
ing only Northwestern to unionize while many other schools were stuck with the 
old system would create instability in the entire division. Even though in the end 
the CAPA’s request was denied and Northwestern was left without a union, the 
case gained vast amounts of media attention and broke boundaries regarding the 
treatment of student-athletes.
 The collapse of the Northwestern players’ attempt to unionize was, thus, 
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largely the result of the governance surrounding college athletics. The NLRB re-
fused to act because it was unable to create a policy that would affect all parts of 
the NCAA. At the time, Northwestern football players were the only ones looking 
to unionize under the CAPA, which meant that the ruling would have only affected 
one school. Although the Northwestern failure was a blow to the efforts made by 
the CAPA, the NLRB’s decision was likely the right one. It was not the right time 
to make policy changes, since, as they stated, doing so would have caused nothing 
but instability in the league. 
 So, when will be the right time, and what will need to happen in order for 
student-athletes to be considered employees? Currently, NCAA universities have 
policies that are influenced by different sectors. Some legislation comes from the 
state level, while other issues are decided by local university governance. The 
NCAA members’ schools are allowed to create their own terms of agreement be-
tween students and institutions, meaning that student-athletes are tied to different 
contracts across the league. This lack of consistency in regulation makes it impos-
sible to pass any bills that affect all student-athletes across the NCAA.
 We suggest that, before attempting to create policies that change the pre-
carious nature of student-athletics, groups such as the CAPA should direct their 
efforts toward fostering a clearer understanding of the real contractual agreements 
between student-athletes and institutions. A federally enforced agreement on the 
employment status of student-athletes across all divisions, states, and institutions 
is critical before trying to create any reforms such as unionization. This research 
still leaves an important question unanswered. Still to be determined are which 
steps still need to be taken, and who should do so, in order to position student-ath-
letes as workers worthy of compensation by the National Labor Relations Act.     
 A suggestion for further action would be for student-athlete representa-
tives from each NCAA sport, division, and institution to come together and create 
a worker collective, though not necessarily a conventional union. With the decline 
of union representation, labourers within creative industries have undertaken a 
new form of collective action. Journalist Josh Eidelson calls this new form of 
worker organization “alt-labour.” Alt-labour groups typically encompass a body 
of labourers within a certain sector which comes together to voice a common goal 
by campaigning to improve rights and working conditions through legislation. 
Some of the better know alt-labour movements have petitioned for the creation 
of a Bill of Rights for domestic workers in New York as well as a wage increase 
for taxi drivers through the formation of Taxi and Limousine Commission. Janice 
Fine from the School of Management and Labour Relations at Rutgers Univer-
sity has studied this new form of worker organization for the last two decades. 
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Given the decline of unions, Fine “was trying to understand what type of orga-
nizations might have been stepping in to fill the void.” Instead, what she found 
was a “growth of community-based worker organizing projects” (Alcorn). Ad-
ditionally, since the NCAA relies on student-athletic labour to run its ‘business,’ 
the students are in a position of power. If the student-athletes were to unite in an 
alt-labour group, they could better wield this power to effect substantial change.. 
If the student-athletes were to unite in an alt-labour group, they could better wield 
this power to effect substantial change. For example, if the student-athletes collec-
tively chose to withhold their labour, the NCAA might become more susceptible 
to bargaining for improvements in the student-athletes working experience. With 
alt-labour groups becoming a more prominent organizational strategy, we suggest 
that this form of collective organization and its ability to foster common goals 
may be a viable option for student-athlete lobbying. Only through protest will an 
overarching understanding of the student-athlete position gain credence, leaving 
the door open for the future improvement of working conditions. 
In summation, NCAA student-athletes currently work under precarious 
labour conditions. The various versions of NCAA jurisdiction that mandate the 
position of student-athletes as both employees and non-employees of their accred-
ited institutions is morally wrong and should be considered an area of potential re-
consideration. Much of the current research on and around intercollegiate athletics 
focuses on the relationship between sports and media culture while little attention 
is paid to the working conditions of student-athletic labour. Further research into 
the effects of the student-athlete classification and the right of collegiate-level ath-
letes to be considered employees is needed in order reduce the precarity created 
by the unjust NCAA legislation.
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